The inadequacy of existing theory comparisons is motivated by the fact that diverge as a rule already established metatheories or are controversial. As a direct consequence that the criteria and the methodology for theory comparison is not the same and so are highly controversial.
The methodological situation is not much better on the other hand, if the previously used metatheories nothing or little to offer on the methodology of a theoretical comparison on its own or even give away.
Typically, went so far theory comparison in this asymmetric way (Matthes 1978, p. 16):
The critics will always own the meta position as unquestionably true starting point.
T 'is then translated into the language of T. Here are deficits, made of rare virtues of T 'to T pin down.
If T 'is a distinct meta-theory of M M' subject is also measured T 'to the supplier M performance criteria and problem scales.
This asymmetric method of theoretical criticism is readily apparent with the roles reversed reversible.
The so criticized theorists of T 'can the same means M 't do to the theory.
is the end, such an event is natural to ask:
* Who is the winner or loser?
* Which theory has more benefits that more defects?
Since the evaluation criteria differ in this performance comparison, admittedly, the question seems not so easily answerable.
Appropriate evaluation criteria can come from nowhere but a metatheory her! It must also be viewed and recognized that the principle of competition of theories and the methodology of analog theory pluralism in way at the level of metatheoretical paradigms must be applied.
It thus three situations are possible: first
T and T 'have the same meta-theory M for the joint condition.
second T and T 'and share with each other competing metatheories M and M' advance, being on the preference of M or M is not 'decided.
third T and T 'and share with each other competing metatheories M and M' advance, we believe, for a given point X, there are enough reasons to decide on the alternative preferred by M or M '.
The case (1) is trivial in so far as the explication of the criteria consistent inter theory test can be made from einundderselben metatheory out. The criteria for the adequacy of problem solving are given with this meta-theory and depend only on their level of development and preparation level.
case (3) is traceable to develop the required decision-making process and under the condition of case (1).
The most difficult and in reality probably the most common case would no be (2). Now it would be
certainly wrong to think that the objective of maximizing criticism in theory competition make it essential to the truth by a knock-out process of total elimination of the once falsified theories (so-Opp 1978, p. 213) to converge.
As not only the truth but also the falsity of an empirical theory (and much less that of a fragmentary theory approach) is never absolute and can be proved once and for all means total elimination of a false deemed theory nothing more than a certain potentially critical Instance forever excluded from the game.
The methodologically correct alternative can only be to try to try to reinforce the "falsified" theory, that is to strive to develop them fertile. (In general, this is not a critic as his personal task view, but the defender the criticized position. But it concerns us here is not zuzuschendien a methodology to certain persons or categories of role, but a methodology for science in general.).
This, however, we come to the question of criteria of theory evaluation and decision process on the admission of theories on competition.
However, since we, as we have just noted, not the goal of elimination of any theory T, T ', ... and are required of any candidate from this series (unless, for practical reasons or constraints), we are also not forced, between M and M 'to decide once and for all. We can
thus devise a method of theory testing, with successive T and T 'together, M with M' with M and T 'and T' must be confronted with M.
Schematically, we represent our model as follows:
M0, M1, M2, ...
T0, T1, T2, ...
M'0, M'1, M'2, ...
T'0, T'1, T'2 ...
The mutual confrontation of metatheory and their critical review of each other and at other inspection bodies from M0 M1 and the new version of its counterpart M'0 M'1 the new version.
The process of mutual criticism theory by integrating the respective metatheories For example, according to the following sequence pattern:
T0 is confronted with in accordance with M0 and M1 T'0.
receive from this process known as preliminary results, both T1 and T'1. This process occurs
in place a permanent revisionism alternative eliminative competition oriented and Managed theories, or theoretical paradigms. Also included in these revisionism always involved and the relevant meta-theoretical foundations and possibly mitrevidiert. This is also much different, for theoretical discussion without metatheoretical consideration is virtually impossible. Only occasionally are such considerations can, within certain limits exclude in a debate.
You just can the truth notice of theories, not by consensus or by majority vote, such as the discourse participants. Towards a better theory is not through avoiding epistemological controversies (Matthes 1978, p. 17), but on their discharge in an explicit and transparent procedures. And that is the object of the theory of comparative methodology in conjunction with the program of theoretical pluralism straight.
The "current confrontational discussion of established theories" (p. 13) is mostly why are not fruitful, real confrontation of theories, because it suffers from the applied self-representation, delimitation and dimming strategies of the respective representatives who instinctively in self-defense, to be mobilized but also to immunize against the criticism by alternatives that often.
One could of course try to object to the scheme exposed above the permanent revisionism, it falls short of the self-set goal to formulate a methodology of criticism maximization, trace it so far nothing more than the typical flow of inter-writable empirically theoretical influence patterns. Accordingly, there was the description set out means nothing beyond the obvious criteria for the optimization of this process of cognitive processes can be. Or to make advances in knowledge actually measured.
Even if the main power of this model only would be written on a systematic and orientation, it is estimated to be quite substantial, especially given the rather could muddled debate on the situation on the subject of comparison theory, which can be characterized as probably dominated by ambiguity. Moreover, there are already through the system but this model almost by itself is relatively clear-cut gaps and areas of responsibility for filling or editing. This is probably not more than what one might expect from a schema.
theory comparison is taken here not merely as a means of theory testing (pp. 7), but as the method of the theory test itself that the discussion during the transition from theory comparison the theory test already ending proves that the previous discussion was not more than a non-binding preliminary skirmishing.
A blurry picture of the theory of comparative methodology as such adjusted affected the view on the way forward and that each judge adequately achieved.
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Hondrich / Matthes 1978: Karl Otto Hondrich, Joachim Matthes (ed.), comparison theory in the social sciences , Darmstadt Neuwied 1978th
Matthes 1978: Joachim Matthes, The discussion of the theory of comparison since the Kassel Sociological 1974, in: Hondrich / Matthes 1978, p. 7-20.
Opp 1978: Karl-Dieter Opp, Problems and strategies of the theory of comparative , in: Hondrich / Matthes 1978, p. 213-218.
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